Author: Margaret Hellner
An economy cannot cast a ballot, yet governments often treat “the markets” as a constituency they cannot afford to disappoint. Weeks’s account of politicians awaiting financial approval makes that relationship especially troubling (Weeks 2018). The greatest danger is that economic power can decide which democratic demands are considered realistic in the first place. Elections may remain competitive while the range of policies citizens can meaningfully choose grows narrower. For Model UN delegates, international debt negotiations affect what governments can promise citizens.
Milton Friedman gives us a good reason to value economic independence: someone with alternative employers or income sources is harder to coerce (Friedman 1962). He recognizes that monopoly can undermine those alternatives. He hopes economic power can restrain political authority. But who receives that independence matters. John Weeks links declining union strength to the growing fusion of wealth and political influence (Weeks 2018). A labor union gives workers an institution through which their objections can carry weight. Without comparable ways to organize, a worker’s formal freedom to refuse a job offers little protection against the need to pay rent. Market choice is only as useful as the resources that make choosing possible. That inequality also shapes civic identity. Wendy Brown describes neoliberalism as a political rationality, or way of governing, that extends market reasoning into everyday life, encouraging people to understand themselves as entrepreneurs responsible for their own welfare (Brown 2006). Financial insecurity then becomes a problem to manage through personal improvement, potentially displacing questions about wages or public services. I now wonder how often judging individual choices prevents us from questioning the choices institutions make. When people experience a common problem as separate personal failures, organizing around it becomes harder. Economic power benefits from that isolation.
This helps explain why international finance poses a democratic problem that national elections alone cannot resolve. In Weeks’s account, Spanish banks faced financial pressures as investors speculated in government bonds, which intensified pressure for austerity, or government spending cuts (Weeks 2018). The consequences crossed borders, but citizens were left bargaining with their own governments over the resulting sacrifices. Describing those sacrifices as what markets require can obscure decisions about whose interests institutions protect. Brown’s account of governance judged by business standards clarifies how satisfying financial actors can become a sign of responsible leadership even when it conflicts with public demands (Brown 2006). Friedman’s concern about concentrated power remains useful here, especially when we apply it to private institutions that limit democratic choice. If economic independence protects freedom, institutions must make that independence available to people with little wealth as well as those with considerable capital. Strong collective bargaining and public oversight of finance would give civic participation more material force. A democracy should let citizens debate what economic life is for, including whose security it should protect. Its health depends on whether people can change the terms on which the economy operates, instead of continually shrinking their expectations to fit them.
Bibliography
Brown, Wendy. 2006. “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization.” Political Theory 34 (6): 690–714. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591706293016.
Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Weeks, John. 2018. “Free Markets and the Decline of Democracy.” Review of Radical Political Economics 50 (4): 637–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/0486613418772167.